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I. BENJAMIN COMPSON AND THE PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS 
A study of consciousness in the first section of The Sound and the 
Fury clarifies both the novel's technique and its rendering of human truth. 
My reading of this monologue is based on the premise that the way Benjamin 
Compson views the world and the way in which his mind arranges those views 
enhances our understanding of the novel's other brother-narrators, Quentin 
and Jason. As limited and distorted as Benjy's perceptions may be, they pro-
vide a model by which the perceptions of Quentin and Jason gain clarity and 
meaning. Benjy's monologue begins the novel and provides the reader's en-
trance into the novel's fictional world. Indeed, Benjy's perception of reality 
ends the novel as well, for the fourth and final section ends with a descrip-
tion of the world through Benjy's serene and empty eyes. 
Analysis of consciousness and perception is lacking in the criticism 
written on the first section of The Sound and the Fury. Although the section 
purports to record the streaming of Benjy's consciousness, critics have 
failed to treat him as a "consciousness at work in the world. 111 Instead, 
the critical slant has been indirect and oblique, and while superficially 
accurate, ultimately shallow. Critics emphasize only Benjy's functionary 
role. He is, they say, thoroughly objective. He records everything, indis-
criminately and without bias. 2 Furthermore, the way other characters respond 
1 Wayne c. Booth, "Distance and Point-of-View: An Essay in Classifica-
tion," in The Novel: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Robert Murray Davis 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 186. 
2 \ Elaborations of this point may be found in the following: Irving Howe, 
''The Passing of a World," in Twentieth-Century Interpretations of The Sound 
and the Fury, ed. Michael H. Cowan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1968), pp. 35-35; John W. Hunt, William Faulkner: Art in Theological Tension 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964), p. 37; Michael Millgate, ~ 
Achievement of William Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 91. 
2 
3 to Benjy reflects their own humanity. Such emphasis stems, I suspect, from 
the unique qualities of the narrator. Benjy is retarded, and according to 
4 
an unnamed character in the novel, he has been "three years old thirty years." 
I suspect that either critics assume that Benjy is not and could not be a 
"consciousness at work in the world," or that the writer could not possibly 
create, with any integrity, the consciousness of a mentally disabled charac-
ter. Still others may assume that the consciousness of one who is retarded is 
unfathomable by those of normal intelligence. In any case, Faulkner's crea-
tion of Benjy has been granted a stay of investigation. 
I do not hold with any of these critical approaches or assumptions. The 
thesis of this essay is based, instead, on my belief that, although Benjy is 
limited, his consciousness is at work in the world. Furthermore, the way his 
consciousness works is fathomable. His very mental limitations and perceptual 
abnormalities determine the kind of language and structure employed in his 
monologue; and the language and structure, in turn, reflect the dimensions of 
his consciousness. A demonstration of this premise leads, ultimately, to a 
clearer and more cohesive reading of the novel. 
Since Benjy's mental limitations have obviated, for many critics, the 
task of direct character analysis, the problems such limitations present 
3 Elaborations of this point may be found in the following: 
man, Faulkner, The Ma1or Years: A Critical Study (Bloomington: 
University Press, 1966), p. 17: Millgate, p. 91; Peter Swiggart, 
the Fury (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), pp. 88-89. 
Melvin Back-
Indiana 
The Sound and 
4William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York: Vintage Books, 
Alfred A. Knopf ~nd Random House, 1946), p. 19. The text of the above edition 
of The Sound and the Fury is reproduced photographically from a copy of the 
first printing. Hereafter all quotations from The Sound and the Fury will be 
taken from this edition and will be immediately followed in the text by a page 
reference. 
3 
must provide a starting point for our description of Benjy's consciousness. 
Those problems are, broadly, problems of credibility intrinsic to any rendering 
of a limited intelligence. More specifically, The Sound and the Fury presents 
the reader and the critic with the mind-wanderings of a retarded adult who 
seems to tell his own story in the first person, but who has never in his 
fictional life spoken a single word. It is no wonder that critics have avoided 
considering his ''words" as indices of his mind when his mind is incapable of 
forming his ''words." 
In approaching these problems we must begin, in Arnold Weinste~n's words, 
5 
with the "onslaught the book makes against the reader." The first sentence 
of Benjy's section carries the weight of the problem and suggests the magni-
tude of the authorial intention. "Through the fence, between the curling 
flower spaces, I could see them hitting." (1) The sentence announces the 
perceptual stance of Benjamin Compson and invites us to share his narrow 
6 
vision. Followiµg the phrases "through the fence" and "between the curling 
flower spaces," in which the focus is narrowed and clarified by a description 
of its tangible boundaries, the "I" can see or perceive the "hitting" that is 
going on beyond the fence. While the image of visual focusing requires our 
critical concern with Benjy's point of view, the context of that point of 
view suggests its precise but idiosyncratic nature. "Curling flower spaces" 
5Arnold L. Weinstein, Vision and Response in Modern Fiction (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 111. 
6 
Weinstein, pp. 111-14. Mr. Weinstein begins with a similar premise--
that the reader ~st perceive the story with the kind of ''vision" that the 
beginning of the monologue describes. His argument moves in a different 
direction, however, for he concentrates on the "enigmatic, and unnamed" emo-
tion that must be perceived. 
4 
is an anomalous expression in which tangible shapes are described as spaces. 
Beyond this strange perceptual peephole, the motions of an ordinary golf game 
and the search which Benjy's attendant, Luster, makes for a missing quarter 
display a perplexing quality of aimless activity. 
They were coming toward where the flag was and I went 
along the fence. Luster was hunting in the grass by the 
flower tree. They took the flag out, and they were 
hitting. Then they put the flag back and they went to 
the table, and he hit and the other hit. Then they went 
on, and I went along the fence. Luster came away from 
the flower tree and we went along the fence and they 
stopped and we stopped and I looked through the fence 
while Luster was hunting in the grass. (1) 
The fence with its curling flower spaces provides, as does Alice in Wonderland's 
tunnel, the only literal and metaphorical corridor through which the reader 
may enter a private and eccentric world. The world is Benjy's consciousness 
and, even in the first paragraph of the novel, the strangeness of it is ex-
plicit. As though the challenge of entering this world were not great enough, 
Faulkner follows it several pages later with the disclosure of Benjy's mute-
ness. Though he may moan or bellow in response to unpleasant circumstances, 
Benjy is incapable of any more sophisticated articulation. By means of the 
sequence of these critical challenges, the reader has been tricked, as it 
were, into assuming a difficult point of view only to discover that the con-
sciousness from whose perspective reality is perceived cannot possibly form, 
even with fictional license, the words that are written on the page. 
Such apparent technical absurdity makes consideration of point of view 
a serious critical problem and raises related questions concerning the inte-
grity of the creative consciousness. If the words cannot be Benjy's, how can 
they presume to represent his consciousness? Do they, in fact, form the 
5 
rhetoric of another consciousness--the author's perhaps? Or does the language 
fail to produce a rhetoric consistent with any single, organic consciousness 
despite the consistent use of the first person singular narrator? If the line 
between fictional and authorial consciousness is indistinct or non-existent, 
are "vision and technique in complete harmony" in the novel and does 
Faulkner keep ''within his aesthetic means" as Irving Howe so positively as-
7 
serts? Is the first section of The Sound and the Fury an integral part of 
"an indubitable masterpiece of what James loved to call the 'fictive art' 11 ?8 
In the essay which follows I hope to substantiate my belief that Faulkner 
does, in fact, keep within his aesthetic means, that his vision of portraying 
Benjy's point of view is accomplished by means of an innovative and sophisti-
cated stream-of-consciousness technique. Faulkner neither interprets the flux 
of Benjy's consciousness nor does he refine himself out of existence. Rather, 
he is present in Benjy's "narrative" in a highly specialized sense, as trans-
lator of his character's thoughts and perceptions into words so apt and con-
sistent with what we learn of Benjy's mental abilities and inabilities that 
they might indeed be Benjy's words, could he form them. The words on the 
page serve as exact perceptual indicators that parallel the otherwise silent 
and unknown realities of Benjy's consciousness. 
If words presume to parallel the silent realities of consciousness, con-
sistency is the criterion for technical virtuosity. Each word must prove 
7 
Howe, p. 39. 
8
conrad Aiken, ''William Faulkner: The Novel as Form," in Three Decades 
of Criticism, ed. Frederick J. Hoffman and Olga W. Vickery (New York: Har-
court, Brace, and World, 1963), p. 141. 
6 
consistent with what we learn of Benjy's abilities and inabilities; his per-
ceptions must, in turn, prove consistent with each other and representative 
of an organic consciousness. In Norman Friedman's words, "consistency sig-
nifies that the parts have been adjusted to the whole, the means to the end, 
9 
and hence that the maximum effect has been rendered." The parts of Benjy's 
consciousness must be adjusted to the whole of his being, and Faulkner's 
structural and linguistic means of suggesting consciousness must be consistent 
with the larger themes and structure of the novel. Only then may the novel 
be said to render a unified effect. With this criterion of consistency in 
mind, I will examine the characterization of Benjamin Compson, first through 
the language by which Faulkner indicates a latent rhetoric, and secondly through 
the pattern his consciousness displays as we follow the wanderings of his mind 
on April 7, 1928. I will conclude by placing the themes and methodology of 
section one in the context of the larger structure of the novel. 
II. PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE 
The structure and perceptual attributes of Benjy's consciousness ori-
10 
ginate in his ignorance of the cause-effect relationship. Indications of 
9 
Norman Friedman, "Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Cri-
tical Concept," in The Novel: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Robert Murray 
Davis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 166. 
10
c1eanth Brooks, "Primitivism in The Sound and the Fury," in English 
Institute Essays 1952, ed. Alan S. Downer (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1954), pp.. 9-10. Mr. Brooks does not relate Benjy's ignorance of 
cause-effect relationships to rhetorical uses. 
7 
this stringent limitation of intellect pervade the language of section one of 
The Sound and the Fury and account for Benjy's fragmented and unconnected ob-
serva tions of the externa 1 world. To Benjy, ice is a "piece of water," and 
for him darkness simply comes and goes at random. He cannot relate the coming 
of the "dark spot" in his cereal bowl to his consumption of its contents. 
Even when he burns his hand in the wood-stove fire, Benjy makes no mental 
equation between fire and pain, nor does he know why ''My voice went louder 
then and my hand tried to go back in my mouth." (72) That coldness produces 
ice, that eating produces an empty bowl, that fire burns--all of these relation-
ships of cause and effect are totally omitted or hopelessly muddled in Benjy's 
mind. 
Such a disabling limitation of intellect prescribes and sets limits upon 
the kind of critical treatment Benjy and his monologue require. If Benjy can-
not understand a simple causal action, he cannot begin to understand motive 
and intent, or to distinguish between a morally responsible or irresponsible 
act. By virtue of his ignorance, he is a living model of prelapsarian inno-
cence.11 Unlike the other characters who populate The Sound and the Fury, 
Benjy may not be placed in an ethical context. Because we are unencumbered 
by the difficulties of making moral judgments, we are especially obliged to 
study the perceptual attributes of Benjy's consciousness and discover what 
an inaccurate or incomplete perception of causal action does to inner and 
outer reality. 
11Hyatt H. \Waggoner, William Faulkner: From Jefferson to the World 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), p. 40. 
8 
The rhetorical effects of Benjy's causal ignorance are two-fold. Most 
obviously, the language which Faulkner uses to indicate perception displays 
the kind of simple confusion that we have already noticed. The confusion 
which attends causal ignorance accounts for some of the poetic expressions 
in section one. Faulkner uses the poetic effect, particularly that of synes-
thesia, to express the chaos of Benjy's observations. Benjy feela the "bright 
cold" (4) and he smells the sickness that is a "cloth folded on Mother's 
head." (75) He is ignorant of the operations of the universe, the assign-
ment of a certain activity or property to a corresponding subject. He is 
equally, if not more intensely, confused by the properties of his own being, 
the correspondence of one sensation to a certain part of his own body. 
I couldn't see it, but my hands saw it, and I could hear 
it getting night and my hands saw the slipper but I 
couldn't see myself, but my hands could see the 
slipper. (88) 
To Benjy experiences are so fragmented and disorderly that he cannot perceive 
them in any but a fragmented and chaotic way. 
These examples of synesthesia appropriately represent the limitations 
of Benjy's intellect, but they do not tell the whole story of his conscious-
ness. Those same mental limitations account not only for his moments of 
confusion but also for other rhetorical instances of active, though uncon-
scious, efforts to transform reality into manageable, even pleasurable, 
experiences. In other occurrences of synesthesia, Benjy seems to flaunt 
confusion, transcend the mental void that results from causal ignorance, and 
ascend to a level of reality that is, for him, sublime. The following example 
is a case in point: 
I could smell the clothes flapping and the smoke 
blowing blue across the branch. I sat down on the 
bank, where they were washing, and the smoke blowing 
blue. (15) 
9 
We know from Benjy's description of the flapping flag in the first paragraph 
of the novel that he understands the visual significance of "flapping." We 
may also infer from his reference to Versh smelling like dogs that he knows 
something about the properties of "smelling." We nrust recall, however, that 
watching the servant washing clothes in the branch is a pleasant experience 
attended by happy associations with childhood merry-making at the same branch. 
Furthermore, the language suggests, through the internal alliteration and 
repetition within the two sentences, a dream-like, transcendent state of con-
sciousness. Words ending in 11--ing" are used four times; "blowing" is repeated 
in the second sentence. The 11--sm" sound is repeated three times, the "--b" 
sound, five times. The lyricism of the sentences produces a soothing effect. 
Although Benjy cannot form the words, the almost hypnotic sound effects be-
speak the perceptual operations of Benjy's mind as he sits watching the "smoke 
blowing blue." The qualities of smelling and flapping and blowing easily 
merge in a way that appeals to all of Benjy's senses and grants serenity to 
his often-troubled mind. 
In other rather complex yet pleasurable synesthetic experiences the use 
and arrangement of words reveals that Benjy actually enjoys the absence of 
clarity in certain relationships. In one such example of synesthesia, unre-
lated descriptive words refer to only one verb, to only one single motion. 
buzzards ate Nancy, flapping black and slow, and heavy out of 
the ditch." (42) The proper description of the scene would be arranged as 
follows: The he~vy, black, buzzards flapped slowly out of the ditch. The 
phrase "flapping black" indicates that the reality of the buzzards' existence 
10 
is lost or transcended by Benjy's connecting color with movement. 
Similarly, the repeated description of the "coming" of the "bright smooth 
shapes" suggest another serene, visionary quality of experience. Whatever 
the situation that elicits the shapes, whether the flowing of shadows during 
the carriage-rid~ or the descent into sleep, or the flickering of the fire, 
the description remains constant and is expressed synesthetically. 
I could hear Queenie's feet and the bright shapes went 
smooth and steady on both sides, the shadows of them 
flowing across Queenie's back ••.• The ones on the 
other side began again, bright and fast and smooth, like 
when Caddy sa_ys that we are going to sleep. [the 
carriage~ridej (11, 13) 
Then the dark began to go in smooth, bright shapes, like 
it always does, even when Caddy says that I have been 
asleep. (92) 
Then I looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth 
shapes went again. (69) 
Neither shadows, which suggest the shapes in one case, nor sleep, in another, 
is bright. Nor can shapes or shadows be felt as the word "smooth" might 
suggest. The "beginning again" motion of the shapes cannot include the adverb 
11 fast" along with the adjectives "bright and smooth." We know, however, that 
this merging of sense impressions provides Benjy's most pleasurable experience. 
He unconsciously makes use of his perceptual chaos,adjusting it to his own 
need for wholeness and escape from an exterior world within which he is help-
less. 
The recurrence of Benjy's real or imagined vision of smooth shapes is 
as important to the reader's understanding of Benjy as to Benjy's inner 
peace. The shapes become a symbol of Benjy's being, a summary of his needs, 
and, in the synesthetic mode of their expression, an indication of his perceptual 
11 
traits. One wonders about the origin of the mysterious vision. I do not 
think we are given sufficient evidence in the text to determine exactly how 
and when the shapes first began to assume importance, but their inexorable 
connection with Benjy's devotion to his sister Caddy is obvious. She is 
explicitly related to the measured flow of shapes and their shadows during 
the carriage-ride. "The ones on the other side [of the street] began again, 
bright and fast and smooth, like when Caddy says that we are going to sleep." 
(13) When she is not explicitly included in a reference to the shapes, her 
presence is implici4 for the description of the shapes is constant. "Then 
I looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth shapes went again." (69) 
All descriptions of the shapes echo the central one that ends Benjy's narra-
tive on April 7, 1928. "Then the dark began to go in smooth, bright shapes, 
like it always does, even when Caddy says that I have been asleep." (92) We 
cannot determine the precise origin of the shapes. Did Caddy's gentle, warm, 
unaltering childhood affection for Benjy grant the kind of pleasure that he 
then related to other pleasurable experiences? Or does Benjy's intrinsic 
need for changelessness, predictability, and causeless motion account for 
his connecting Caddy with experiences of serenity and ritual? Whatever the 
order of his needs and pleasures, Caddy is eminently, if not preeminently, 
important; for she enlivens, either in actuality or memory, Benjy's percep-
tually satisfying experiences with the warmth and gentleness that only human 
affection may grant. The shapes remain an experience of fusion, an example 
of the way human beings, even very limited human beings, relate their needs 
to the pleasure and balm that the real world, however sparsely, makes available. 
The description of the shapes tells us that Benjy enjoys the changelessness 
12 
inherent in their self-perpetuating motion and in their duplicative occur-
rences. It is natural that Benjy should abhor change and value changelessness. 
If he cannot understand the relationship of cause and effect, he cannot under-
stand change in its most insignificant form. Furthermore, Benjy agonized and, 
on April 7, 1928, continues to agonize over the changes in his life. His 
memories of Caddy's use of perfume, her loss of virginity, her wedding, his 
drunkenness and his castration,are painful, even hysterical. Benjy possesses 
the mental tools to perceive change and the contrast suggested therein. But 
he cannot begin to understand or reverse those changes. 
Although change is the most threatening force in his life, Benjy unwit-
tingly participates in change by altering much of the material that filters 
through his aberrant mind. Such alterations of reality inform Faulkner's 
linguistic translation of Ben.1y's thoughts and perceptions in scrupulously 
apt details of idiom and diction. Such alterations are complex indications 
of the functioning of a perceptual faculty which seems both to pursue satis-
faction and to manipulate phenomena. Language reflects Benjy's unconscious 
effort to accommodate reality to his limited means of perceiving it, reflecting 
upon it, and responding to it. What results is a linguistic recasting of 
reality in terms of Benjy's narrow prescription for it. 
Perhaps the most pivotal of these linguistic uses is the puzzling and 
seemingly inconsistent use of the verb and the verbal. Given his ignorance 
of cause, Benjy does not understand the relationship of motion to an object 
receiving the motion. Verbs, therefore, are not used in proper relation to 
an object. ''The men hit," Quentin "chunks" into the shadows, Luster "threw," 
\ 
the steam "tickled into my mouth," the cow "chewed at us," and Dan "scuffled 
13 
into the moonlight." Though the verb itself may be used acceptably, it 
lacks a necessary direct object and is often accompanied by a multitude of 
prepositional phrases. Because he cannot understand cause-effect actions, 
Benjy seeks to establish everything about a verbal experience except its 
verbal action. Place, setting, time of an actionareobsessively important. 
Even in the first paragraph of the Benjy section, a peculiar use of verbs 
occurs simultaneously with an overuse of prepositional phrases and adverbs 
which tell of time and place but not of action specifically. 
Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, 
I could see them hitting. They were coming toward where 
the flag was and I went along the fence. Luster was 
hunting in the grass by the flower tree. They took the 
flag out, and they were hitting. When they put the flag 
back and they went to the table, and he hit and the other 
hit. (1) 
The kind of language used above indicates that two factors are at work in the 
way Benjy's mind perceives and reflects upon reality. We see that he is most 
insistent upon specifying and recording experience as a sequence of actions 
that partakes of the same measured, sequential quality as the "corning" of 
the shapes. He necessarily avoids specifying the cause-effect nature of the 
action involved. Benjy never reaches the conceptualization that the men hit 
a ball, much less that they play golf. The action is circumscribed and circum-
vented in layers of virtually irrelevant detail. 
Benjy's use of the verbal is a natural consequence of his misuse of the 
verb and his ignorance of cause-effect relationships. The word choice in 
verbal usage is precise and specialized, derived from such verbs as "scuffle," 
"chunk," "rasp," "nuzzle," and "tumble." Benjy notices the "rattling and 
rustling leaves," the ground that is ''hard, churned, and knotted," and the 
14 
hole in the barn roof that seems to be "full of spinning yellow." These 
verbals are deeply and narrowly descriptive, their use is sophisticated and 
reflects a correspondingly sophisticated faculty of observation. Equally 
significant, however, is the way in which such verbal emphasis alters that 
experience or phenomenon that Benjy is considering. The descriptive verbal 
changes the nature of motion from process to effect. Just as the heavy use 
of prepositional phrases places extreme emphasis upon place and direction, so 
the equally heavy use of the participle represents only that segment of motion 
and process that involves the completed and descriptive effect. Motion is, 
thereby, contained in the verbal and not shown in relation to an object that 
is acted upon by a verb. Benjy does not and cannot understand the process 
by which the ground becomes churned and knotted, yet he perceives the finished 
effect in all of its multifariousness. 
Balancing one handicap with an opposing strength, Benjy attempts to con-
strain motion, and this tendency is mirrored in the sparse use of the simile 
as well as the excessive use of the verbal. Here again an aberrant percep-
tual faculty alters the reality it perceives. The following simile is a case 
in point: "They ~he shapes] went on like the bright tops of wheels." (11) 
Here, the nature of a wheel's cyclical motion is transformed into the linear, 
sequential motion of bright, smooth shapes. It is as though the image lops 
off the lower half of the spinning wheel and captures, aberrantly, the repeti-
tive motion of one wheel-top perpetually following the other. The nature of 
the wheel's motion which allows the shapes to move on, is recycled into a 
kind of static, self-perpetuating, linear motion. The principle is the same 
with the motion of fire. To Benjy its reality lies not in its burning or 
destructiveness but in its repetitive self-duplication. 
Then I looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth 
shapes went again. (69) 
There was a fire. It was rising and falling on the walls. 
There was another fire in the mirror. (75) 
15 
Rather than serving as a symbol of destruction, the fire is a stable symbol 
of contained, subdued vitality. 
A second simile treats motion in a different way but with the same kind 
of result. The context of the metaphor is the aftermath of Caddy's wedding 
when she rushes toward Benjy, no longer smelling of "trees in the rain." 
"Then I saw Caddy, with flowers in her hair, and a long veil like shining 
wind." (4 7) Again the language tells us that in the act of perceiving and 
reflecting upon reality Benjy seeks to stabilize and set limits upon motion 
which is inherently unstable and illimitable. The comparison of Caddy's veil 
to "shining wind" distorts the qualities of motion and forces an unconventional 
definition upon it. Wind, which is a kind of motion, assumes the qualities 
of a tangible effect possessing both surface and boundary, for it is not only 
likened to a veil but it is also said to shine. Placing the simile within 
its dramatic context also helps to reveal its significance. The wedding veil 
horrifies Benjy because it signifies change. Caddy does not ordinarily wear 
a veil, and so he responds to this change just as he did to her earlier use 
of perfume. It is as though Caddy were no longer Caddy. 12 The comparison he 
makes between the wind and the veil removes him temporarily from the discon-
certing moment, for his mind considers something which represents instability 
1201ga w. Vickery, The Novels of William Faulkner: A Critical Interpre-
tation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p. 35. 
16 
(the wind) and converts it, metaphorically, into a captured state. In this 
way Benjy forestalls the pain of change and, in so doing, perverts the nature 
of motion. 
The eccentric uses of language that serve as precise indications of 
Benjy's perceptual tendencies suggest that he avoids discomfort, compensates 
for his mental handicap, and attempts to establish, perceptually, a private 
inviolate world in which he is comfortable and in control. Benjy does not 
always successfully avoid frustration,and he possesses enough self-knowledge 
and awareness of his deficiencies so that his frustration becomes not only 
obvious but also, at times, manifestly violent. He reveals, on rare occasions, 
frustration with his inability to complete an act that is begun. In his con-
frontation with the Burgess girl, he "tries to say," to express through the 
motion of clumsy embrace the feelings that are inside him. 
I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. I was 
trying to say, and I caught her, trying to say, and 
she screamed and I was trying to say and trying 
(64) 
Later in the same scene Benjy is again unable to complete an act and he is 
agonizingly aware of this inability . 
. . . I tried to cry. But when I breathed in, I 
couldn't breathe out again to cry, ••• (64) 
Moreover, the consistent use of "could" with an attendant verb when involving 
a personal act is tellingly juxtaposed to a consistent use of the simple past 
when actions of other characters are considered. Examples may be chosen at 
random as is the following: "Caddy gave me the cushion and I could look at 
the cushion and the mirror and the fire." (88) The juxtaposition indicates 
\ 
some effort to delineate the range of his own abilities, to declare his own 
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capabilities, and to reassure himself that he does possess the capacity to 
affect the world around him. The need for such reassurance, coupled with the 
frustrations of attempt and failure, reveals not only Benjy's awareness of the 
threatening nature of action and motion but also his awareness of a personal 
deficiency. Through Benjy's dim and pathetic awareness of his limitations and 
his failures, the reader may infer that he is conscious of his own being, that 
he is, at least intuitively, assured of his "I-ness. 11 The passage below cry-
stallizes the kind of self-awareness Benjy possesses. 
I squatted there, holding the slipper. I couldn't 
see it, but my hands saw it, and I could hear it 
getting night, and my hands saw the slipper but I 
couldn't see myself, but my hand could see the slipper, 
and I squatted there, hearing it getting dark. (88) 
In his confusion about himself and the relationship of his body to himself, 
we may see that Benjy is aware of his own consciousness and that he possesses 
some primordial realization that his consciousness is both distinct and "at 
work in the world." 
III. CONSCIOUSNESS AND NARRATIVE STRUCTURE 
In providing Benjy a latent rhetoric, Faulkner shows that Benjy lacks 
the mental tools to understand the cause-effect relationship that is so intrin-
sic to real world experiences. Lacking such a faculty, Benjy may at times 
appear confused and even hysterical. At other times, however, he manages to 
transcend his confusion and pain and find an order and stability in his per-
ceptual distortions of the world about him. His life is a series of painful 
\ 
experiences and serene but fleeting moments of escape and pleasure. A study 
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of the arrangement of narrative segments in section one corroborates these 
characteristics of Benjy's consciousness. An order, adjusted to these charac-
teristics of consciousness, inheres in the sequential arrangement of present 
and past time scenes and episodes. 
Although Benjy can make no intellectual distinction between experiences 
which occur in the present and those which ~ccurred in the past, his mind 
does make choices in the material it chooses to consider and in the sequence 
of those considerations. The associative faculty which Benjy possesses does 
not in itself account for the arrangement of episodes and scenes (either recol-
lected or immediate), for one experience may provide a number of possible asso-
ciations and his mind must ultimately choose which association to enlarge 
upon. The following narrative segment, which records the flow of Benjy's 
mind upon entering the barn with Luster on April 7, 1928, shows that Benjy not 
only makes associations but that he also chooses among several possible asso-
ciations. The mental and narrative shift occurs when Benjy abandons attention 
to the barn, its roof, the slanting hole, and Luster's admonitions and focuses 
instead on a past day when Caddy walks with him through that same barn. 
The floor was dry and dusty. The roof was falling. The 
slanting holes were full of spinning yellow. What do 
ou want to o that wa for. You want to et our head 
knocked off with one of them balls. April 7, 1928. 
The present .J . 
"Keep your hands in your pockets." Caddy said, "Or 
they'll be froze. You don't want your hands froze on 
Christmas, do you." foec. 23 between 1900 and 1905~ 
We went around the'barn. The big cow and the little 
one were standing in the door, and we could hear Prince 
and Queenie and Fancy stomping inside the barn. "If it 
wasn't so cold, we'd ride Fancy." Caddy said, "But it's 
too cold to hold on today." [still Dec. 23~ (13) 
The associative clues are obvious. One tour of the barn reminds Benjy of 
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another; one admonition reminds him of an earlier one. Other associative 
clues could have led Benjy just as easily to other recollections--of the day 
of Caddy's wedding, for example, when he also noticed the hole of "spinning 
yellow." Luster's admonition could have drawn his attention to any number 
of admonitions from other earlier attendants. The question that we must 
seek to find answers for involves the precise course Benjy's mind 'follows on 
April 7, 1928. Why does his mind turn to certain recollections, favor certain 
associations over other equally available ones? If criteria can be found, 
what do they tell us about the consciousness we are seeking to understand? 
These questions may not be answered without clarifying the nature of 
consciousness and the definition of stream-of-consciousness technique on which 
this essay is based. Benjy's speechlessness confuses the critical issues be-
cause it is impossible to distinguish between the usual levels of consciousness--
"speech level" and "pre-speech level." Robert Humphrey defines consciousness 
as 
. • . the entire area of mental attention, from pre-
consciousness on through the levels of the mind up to 
and including the highest one of rational, communicable 
awareness.13 
He adds that most stream-of-consciousness fiction places emphasis upon "ex-
ploration of the pre-speech levels of consciousness for the purpose, primarily, 
14 
of revealing the psychic being of characters." 'The levels of Benjy's 
13Robert Humphrey, Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1954), p. 2. 
14 Humphrey,, p. 4. 
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consciousness must be distinguished by different qualities since he has no 
discernible speech level. Analogous distinctions may be made concerning Benjy's 
consciousness by determining the kind of mental attention Benjy exerts at 
different stages of the narration. We may characterize the kinds of mental 
activity in three ways. At the beginning of the narrative and for a space of 
several pages, Benjy's mind functions at the height of his mental awareness. 
It functions analytically, seeking maximum meaning in the discrete episodes it re-
views. As the narrative progresses, we notice a gradual reduction of mental 
activity; for the analytic habit of mind yields to a synthetic habit of mind 
by which Benjy seeks sameness and declines to make distinctions among differing 
circumstances. Finally, toward the end of the narrative and before Benjy is 
readied for bed, his consciousness withdraws from meaningful intellection and 
seeks the hypnotic pleasure of arranging recollections and present observations 
in meaningless but repetitive order. This day-long flowing of his mind ex-
plains the narrative structure of section one. 
When we first meet Benjy, it is during the day of April 7, 1928. The 
shadows are long, and Luster is desperately looking for the lost quarter that 
will buy him a seat at the evening traveling show. Luster directs his charge 
to follow him on the search, and Benjy does so with careful initial attention 
to his immediate surroundings, for he is looking through a fence at the puzzling 
motions of a golf game. His attention to every movement and every utterance 
is scrupulously detailed. "I went along the fence. Luster was hunting in 
the grass by the flower tree. The men took the flag out, and they were hitting." 
(1) Benjy's observation of the immediate and the visible continues in this 
way. Then he records bits of dialogue that he hears and places them and him-
self in proper spatial relation to the motions he observes. 
"Here, caddie." He hit. They went away across the 
pasture. I held to the fence and watched them going 
away. 
"Listen at you, now." Luster said. "Ain't you 
something, thirty-three years old, going on that way. 
After I done went all the way to town to buy you that 
cake. Hush up that moaning. Ain't you going to help 
me find that quarter so I can go to the show tonight." 
They were hitting little, across the pasture. I 
went back along the fence to where the flag was. It 
flapped on the bright trees and grass. (1, 2) 
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Although Benjy can have no speech-level of consciousness, I believe that in 
the beginning of the first section his mind is at the height of its "rational, 
communicable awareness." Although he cannot communicate his thoughts, they 
are at their most rational and communicable level. The words by which the 
writer seeks to parallel Benjy's thoughts bespeak a sense of the immediacy 
of reality, an awareness of spatial and temporal relationships that form the 
physical scenery of Benjy's present being. 
As the narrator continues, the arrangement of scenes continues to reveal 
the dominance of the analytic capacities of Benjy's mind. Because Benjy lapses 
into recollections that he intersperses with scenes from an impinging present-
time, the reader might infer that he is less conscious of reality and farther 
removed from a state of rational awareness than he was at the beginning of 
the monologue. Such is not the case, however, for upon close scrutiny one 
finds that Benjy exercises, for a space of several .pages, considerable insight 
into his own situation. 
An analysis of the character and function of Luster is crucial to a 
revelation of Benjy's equivalent of the speech-level of consciousness. Critics 
have correctly viewed Luster as a useful if callous connection with the real 
world of time and factuality, but they have failed to illumine his role fully. 
Of more subtle significance is the use of Luster as an inverse assessor of 
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Benjy's state of mind. If one trusts Luster's interpretation of Benjy, 
dangerously inaccurate conclusions may follow; and I will take the liberty of 
digressing a bit in order to demonstrate such critical pitfalls. Emily Kaluza, 
the only linguistic critic of The Sound and the Fury whom I could find, begins 
her discussion of the first section with the statement that Benjy is congeni-
tally deaf. The only support she calls upon for her conclusion is a statement 
Luster makes to Quentin's lover concerning Benjy's abnormality. 
''He can't tell what you saying." Luster said. "He 
deef and dumh." 
"Is." he [Quentin's lover] said. "How long' s he 
been that way." 
"Been that way thirty-three years today." Luster 
said. "Born looney • • • • " ( 60) 
Luster's assessment is both ignorant and characteristically flippant. We learn 
early in the narrative that, though he is definitely mute, Benjy is certainly 
not deaf. He hears bugs buzz though he thinks it is grass; he hears the rain 
falling on the roof; and he perceptually records conversation and even Latin 
phrases. Based in large part upon Luster's unreliable assessment of Benjy's 
problems, Kaluza arrives at the equally unreliable conclusion that the only 
"operation that Benjy's mind can perform is that of mechanical identification. 1115 
If the reader is observant, he will avoid this kind of oversimplification 
and will begin to question from the very start the reliability of Luster's 
interpretations. Such observation clarifies the kind of mental operation that 
Benjy's mind can and does perform. As we become gradually more cognizant of 
15 Irena Kaluza, The Functioning of Sentence Structure in the Stream-of-
Consciousness T~chnigue of William Faulkner's 'The Sound and the Fury': A 
Study in Linguistic Stylistics (Krakow: Jagellonian University, 1967), p. 50. 
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Luster's own faulty insights, we become surer of Benjy's rational awareness. 
Luster's commentary begins on the second page of the novel. Directly following 
Benjy's opening observation of men hitting and moving flags, he hears them 
cry out "Here, caddie." (1) Benjy begins to cry and Luster's interpretation 
follows immediately. 
"Listen at you, now." Luster said. "Ain't you 
something, thirty-three years old, going on that way. 
After I done went all the way to town to buy you that 
cake. Hush up that moaning." (1, 2) 
"Shut up that moaning." Luster said. 
them come if they ain't coming, can I." 
"I can 1 t make 
(2) 
At this point the reader accepts Luster's suggestion that Benjy is crying be-
cause the golfers have moved on. On the next page, however, the reader realizes 
that Benjy himself makes some kind of association between a person named 
"Caddy" and the cry of the golfers. As Benjy and Luster crawl through a broken 
place in the fence and Benjy snags himself on a nail, his mind floats quickly 
back to a childhood experience in which "Caddy" "uncaught" him from that same 
fence. With the mention of Caddy, we wonder whether the reason for Benjy's 
crying might not be related to Benjy's association of the two sounds. 
This possibility becomes substantiated as the narrative progresses. Benjy 
remembers an earlier scene from that same day, December twenty-third, between 
1900 and 1905, when Versh, a former attendant, says that Benjy wants to go 
into the bitter cold outdoors. As they stand at the gate, Versh tells Benjy 
to put his cold hands in his pocket and asks the following, complaining 
question: ''Whyn't you wait for them in the house." (4) We learn that Benjy 
is awaiting Caddy, who smells like leaves and "like when she says that we are 
asleep." Immediately following this revery (by which we also learn that 
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Benjy may anticipate events) Luster intrudes with another interpretation of 
the moaning and crying that must have just taken place. ''What are you moaning 
about," (5) he asks rhetorically, and answers characteristically: "You can 
watch them again when we get to the branch." (5) Again we infer that Benjy 
has reacted to a reference, his own mental reference, to Caddy and the warmth 
and intimacy which she represented. The reader suspects that Luster cannot 
be trusted, that Benjy is not crying because the golfers have left but rather 
because of the distinction he makes between his immediate circumstance and 
another different circumstance. It is the disappearance of Caddy, not the 
golfers, which prompts Benjy's discontent. 
This pattern will be repeated consecutively several times. Each time 
that Benjy is reminded of Caddy, Luster reprimands him for crying or moaning. 
Since nothing interrupts this direct shift from Caddy to the sadness that 
attends such association, we must conclude that Benjy makes a willing comparison 
between the immediate world from which Caddy is absent and other circumstances 
in which she is present. In the passage quoted below Benjy is continuing to 
relive December twenty-third. Caddy has taken Benjy up to see their mother 
who has called Benjy her "poor baby." Then she tells Caddy and Versh to take 
him out. After Caddy dismisses Versh, 
we stopped in the hall and Caddy knelt and put her 
arms around me and her cold bright face against mine. 
She smelled like trees. 
''You're not a poor baby. Are you. You've got your 
Caddy. Haven't you got your Caddy. 11 (8) 
Benjy must begin to cry at precisely this point, for he immediately records 
Luster's editorial comment. 
Can't you shut up that moanini and slobbering;, T.uster 
said. Ain't you shamed of yourself, making all this 
racket. We passed the carriage house, where the 
carriage was. (8) 
Benjy makes a willing but unhappy distinction between a distant world in 
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which Caddy was present and the immediate world in which she is unavailable. 
The inherent contrast is painful and disconcerting. 
Focusing his attention upon the immediate physical scene, Benjy comments 
in the passa~e above on the carriage and lapses into another satisfying memory, 
this time of the ritualistic carriage ride that he, his mother, and Dilsey 
take when they visit the ever more populous graveyard. It is the soothing, 
bright, smooth shapes, the interplay of motion and shadow and, most importantly, 
their connection with Caddy that ends this revery of the past. The pattern 
of rational distinction and emotional reaction is repeated again in the fol-
lowing excerpt: 
"Hum up, Queenie." T.P. said. The shapes flowed on. 
The ones on the other side hegan again, bright and 
fast and smooth, like when Caddy says we are going to 
sleep. (12, 13) [emphasis mine] 
Cry baby, Luster said. Ain't you shamed .... What 
do you want to go that wav for. You want to get your 
head knocked off with one of them balls. (13) 
Not only does Benjy react to the loss of Caddy, but he also attempts to find 
her again by heading in the opposite direction, walking toward the fence and 
gate. Luster is sure that Benjy wants to see the golfers again, but the 
reader knows that he is looking for Caddy. Luster diverts Benjy's new course 
and heads him toward the barn. He cannot divert his thoughts, however, for 
Benjy lapses into recollection once again, picks up the story of December 
twenty-third where he had left off, and soothes himself once more with a 
reconstructed world in which Caddy, not Luster, is his guide. 
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Benjy demonstrates his painful awareness of the absence of Caddy one 
more time during this initial sequence of scenes and episodes. Luster is still 
looking for his quarter and his search now takes place by the branch. As Lus-
ter talks to another Negro, Benjy hears the sounds of the golf game. 
The man said '~addie'' up the hill. The boy got out 
of the water and went up the hill. 
"Now, just listen at you." Luster said. "Hush up." 
''What he moaning about now. 11 [said the other Negro] 
"Lawd knows." Luster said. "He just starts like 
that. He been at it all morning. Cause it his birth-
day, I reckon." (18) 
The pattern of rational distinction and emotional reaction is repeated once 
again. This time, however, Benjy's crying is related to the golfer's calling 
for their "caddie." The details of this scene recall the details of the first 
scene of the narrative. By repeating essentially the same scene, Faulkner 
leaves no doubt that Benjy has associated the golf "caddie" with his sister 
"Caddy" and that we are correct in concluding that Benjy realizes that she is 
absent from the physically immediate world. The structural unity of this 
pattern of Benjy's distinctions and emotional reactions provides one way that 
Faulkner compliments the reader who is able to see "through the fence" and 
"between the curling flower spaces." Luster and the unperceptive reader are 
not granted such vision. 
The ability to make distinctions, to perceive differences between one 
circumstance and another, is consistent with Benjy's ability to reflect upon 
differences in observable phenomena. He says on one occasion that "my shadow 
was higher than Luster's" and, on another, that "the flower tree by the win-
dow wasn't dark but the thick trees were." He distinguishes both similarity 
and difference in relationships when he notices that the long mirror 
in the parlor "was like a door only it wasn't a door" and that "my hands 
saw the slipper but I couldn't see myself." 
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One of Benjy's perceptual strengths, therefore, is his ability to con-
trast two sets of circumstances or two phenomena. Benjy is not capable of 
more complex intellections and so making distinctions represents the greatest 
degree of his rational awareness. I believe that the seemingly chaotic por-
tions of experience that filter through Benjy's mind at the beginning of April 
7, 1928, reveal the highest degree of rationality of which Benjy's mind is 
capable. We notice, however, that, as the day wears on, two things happen to 
the pattern his flowing mind produces. First, the nature of the present 
changes, for it is, in the segment of recollections reviewed above, more a 
part of his consciousness than it will become. The opening paragraph, for 
example, demonstrates more interested and reflective attention to immediate, 
physical details than any other single, present-time passage in the first sec-
tion of the novel. After the second appearance of the golfers and their 
calling for "caddie," Benjy continues to record the conversation and the moving 
scenes of his immediate surroundings, but the nature of the immediate changes; 
for distinctions between the immediate and the recollected are (with two sig-
nificant exceptions) not made. As immediacy is relinquished to a kind of 
introspective enlargement of self and diminution of the physically external 
world, Benjy's mind notes similarities but not differences. Caddy is still 
at the heart of his recollections but no longer does Benjy surface willingly 
to distinguish between her presence then and her absence now. 
As the day wears on and as the narrative continues, the arrangement of 
material in his mind is determined by decreasing mental exertion. No longer 
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are the scene shifts triggered by a distinction made between the immediate 
and the distant, but rather by the less meaningful search Benjy's mind makes 
for similarities. His mind integrates the stories of Damuddy's death and 
the events of her funeral day with the deaths and funerals of Quentin (the 
brother), Mr. Compson, and Roskus. Benjy refers frequently to his ability to 
"smell it," that is, to smell death. Here the perceptual faculty seeks same-
ness and Luster's immediate intrusions about the traveling show and the lost 
quarter, although recorded, are not reacted to and do not fit into the per-
ceptual pattern Benjy's mind temporarily forms. 
After the episodes that reflect generalizations on death, the criteria 
for scene shifts reflect even less rational awareness, for here Benjy's mind 
seeks sameness only in meaningless associations. His mind oscillates first, 
between the events of the day of Damuddy's death and the events of Caddy's 
wedding day, and second, between the present (with Quentin II in the swing) 
and a more distant time in the past when he confronted Caddy in that same 
swing. Benjy never draws any distinctions between the sets of experiences, 
but he integrates them in exact temporal order. He doesn't even react to 
Quentin's replacement of Caddy in the swing. Only the most superficial asso-
ciations combine with the serenity of temporal order to provide impetus for 
the oscillation. The following excerpt is a case in point: 
Go on and watch him, Dilsey said. Keep him out the 
house now. 
Yessum, T.P. said. Is they started yet. 
You go on and keep that boy out of sight, Dilsey 
said. I got all I can tend to. [Caddy's wedding] 
A snake crawled out from under the house. Jason said 
he wasn't afraid of snakes and Caddy said he was but she 
wasn'~ and Versh said they both were and CaddJ said to 
be quiet, like father said. [Damuddy's deathJ 
You ain't got to start bellowing now, T.P. said. You 
want some this sassprilluh. 
It tickled my nose and eyes. 
If you ain't going to drink it, T.P. said. All right, 
here tis. We better et another bottle while ain't nobod 
bothering us. You be quiet now. LCaddy 1 s wedding 
We stopped under the tree by the parlor window. Versh 
set me down in the wet grass. It was cold. There were 
lights in a 11 the windows. [Darnuddy 's death] 
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Although Benjy began the day of April 7, 1928 with a willing exercise of 
his ability to make distinctions, the unhappy results force him to retreat to 
the mindless relinquishment to sequence that characterizes the quotation above. 
This more orderly, more formal, course assures Benjy that he will not lose 
control of a private reality. The more rigid the pattern of flowing episodes, 
the more Benjy is reassured that his world of smooth, flowing "shapes" is 
inviolate. 
But however rigid this pattern may be, it is not inviolate or absolute. 
In his mindless panning of past and present experiences, Benjy stumbles in-
frequently, but terrifyingly, upon events so charged with significance that 
they force a present reaction. Immediately following his oscillation between 
the present scene with Quentin in the swing and his recollection of Caddy in 
the same swing, Benjy is led hy Luster to the fence and the gate where Benjy 
is reminded of his attack on the Burgess girl. Here the frustration and sad-
ness of the past impinges upon the present, for after Benjy's description of 
the attack and the subsequent castration Luster, once again, tells us that 
Benjy is crying. 
They came on, I opened the gate and they stopped, 
turning. I was trying to say, and I caught her, trying 
to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and 
\ trying and the bright shapes began to stop and I tried 
to get out. I tried to get it off of my face, but the 
bright shapes were going again, they were going up the 
hill to where it fell away and I tried to cry. But 
when I breathed in, I couldn't breathe out again to cry, 
and I tried to keep from falling off the hill and I fell 
off the hill into the bright, whirling shapes. [Attack 
on Burgess girl and castration] 
Here loon Luster said. Here come some. Hush our 
moaning, now. present 
They came to the flag. 
then he put the flag back. 
He took it out and they hit, 
[still the present] (64, 65) 
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Impelled by his involuntary recapitulation of the attack and castration scenes, 
noted above, Benjy's consciousness now seeks solace in a stringently ordered 
oscillation between the present and either the day of Benjy's name change or 
the day of Damuddy's death. Though movements and conversations in the present 
are contrapuntally integrated with one of these two past days, no meaning what-
ever is given to the comparative vacancies of immediate circumstances. Though 
a few associative clues are evident at the beginning of this hypnotic pattern, 
even they become unnecessary as the pattern becomes established. The present 
becomes only a touchstone for consistency, a completion of the search his 
mind makes for harmony and order. Only at the very end of the day does the 
emptiness of the present again force Benjy to respond. He is being prepared 
for bed and as Luster begins to put Benjy's pajama pants on, Benjy notices 
with horror the loss of his genitals. Now of course Benjy does not realize 
the sexual implications of his castration but he must make some comparison 
between another time and the immediate. He recognizes change and reacts to 
it. This abrupt surfacing of the consciousness does not last long, however, 
for as Luster diverts his attention toward Miss Quentin's escape down the 
tree, the accumulated associations with Quentin II and I and getting ready 
for bed in the ~resent and the past ignite the last of Benjy's recollections. 
He resumes his recapitulation of the day of Damuddy's death, which ended with 
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bedtime for all the children. Benjy sleeps with Caddy; Father comes in to 
tell them ~oodni~ht; and he pats Benjy on the head. The day has ended. 
Benjy's mental wanderin~s end with a final vision of Caddy and of the "smooth, 
hright shapes" that come when he falls asleep with her. Darkness goes and 
the unconscious realm of smooth shapes rests in Benjy's mind. 
Then the dark began to go in smooth, bright shapes 
like it always does, even when Caddy says that I 
have been asleep. (92) 
IV. BENJY, THE SOUND AND THE FURY, AND FAULKNER'S AESTHETIC 
The preceding interpretation of Benjamin Compson requires a readjustment 
of the relationship of section one to the remainder of The Sound and the Fury. 
Because we find Beniv to he more than a moral measure and a recorder of dia-
logue--to he, in fact. a "consciousness at work in the world"--his dilemma 
deserves to he considered in relation to the dilemmas of the two other brother-
narrators, Quentin and Jason. In this way we can learn more about the novel's 
rendering of the ideal human response to reality. And, a comparative consi-
deration of the three brothers in their order of narrative appearance clarifies 
the relationship between structure and meaning in this difficult four-part 
novel. 
A comparison of the three Compson brothers must be based on one main 
point of dissimilarity and one main point of similaritv. Benjy does not 
possess, as do his two brothers, the mental ability to perceive reality accu-
rately. His need to compensate for his mental weaknesses is, therefore, 
\ 
intrinsic and monolithic. His obsessive fear of change is unavoidable and 
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his effort to establish his own rigid version of reality is a natural con-
sequence of his fear. Quentin and Jason, on the other hand, possess the 
mental skills to view reality accurately. Yet they too persist, just as 
surely as Benjy does, in favorinR a private and distorted perception of rea-
lity. Each becomes as feverishly obsessive as his idiot-brother and the 
16 -
obsessions of each are similarly related to motion, chan~e. and Caddy. 
Quentin, whose monologue follows Benjy's, is threatened by change, not 
because he cannot understand it intellectually, but because he fears it 
emotionally. Denied a psychologically necessary mother-love, Quentin is an 
emotionally scarred adult. He is, in simplistic terms, an emotional child 
and a mental adult; and the discrepancy implied affects his responses both to 
people and to circumstances. Since Caddy is his main source of warmth and 
demonstrative affection, Quentin sees her as the absolute repositor of meaning 
in his Ii fe. Any alteration in his 1uvenile prescription for meaning is 
abnormally upsetting to Quentin. Caddv's sexual awakening alarms him for it 
presages her inevitable realil~nment of affections. Her pregnancy and marriage 
threaten him to the verv core of his being, for he conceives of his being only 
in terms of a relationship with Caddy. 
If Quentin finds such change too painful to accept, he finds his respon-
sihility to effect change and to commit himself to action, impossible. His 
perception of his own role is so sin~le-mindedly defined as preserver of the 
16 Manv critics comment upon the obsessive minds of one or more of the 
Compson brothers. Cleanth Brooks says, for example, that the Compson story 
"is told through one obsessed consciousness after another." (Faulkner: The 
Yoknapatawpha County, p. 325). Peter Swiggart speaks of Quentin's and Jason's 
"puritan obsessions." (The Art of Faulkner's Novels, p. 88) I do not, how-
ever, know of any critics who have compared the obsessive consciousnesses of 
the Compson brothers in precisely that same way that I have in this essay. 
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status quo, of an imperishable relationship with Caddy, that he is repeatedly 
depicted as the observer of, and not the participant in, change, motion, and 
action. Caddy, not Quentin, carries Benjy when he cannot walk, feeds him, 
rubs his cold hands, and soothes him into peaceful sleep. Even Benjy senses 
Quentin's subjective distance, for though he mentions him frequently only 
once does he describe his brother as "smelling like trees." (81) When not 
an unwilling participant, Quentin is an ineffectual one. Not only does he 
fail to shoot Dalton Ames, but he is left, after that nearly comic confronta-
tion, motionless and stunned, nursing a black eye. Even Benjy, as incapable 
as he is of intending and completing an action, makes a more honest attempt 
when he embraces the Burgess girl and "tries to say" and to express the inscru-
table yearnings of his soul. Experiences in which Quentin actively participates 
are either trite or noticeably sparse. One crucial exception is his experience 
with the little lost Italian girl. Late in both narrative and chronological 
time, Quentin meets "a little dirty child with ears like a toy bear's and two 
patent-leather pig-tails." (155) She appears to be lost and Quentin assumes 
that she wants help and that he can indeed provide that help. At first he 
is persistent in his efforts to locate the child's home. However, his even-
tual rejection of her serves as his penultimate rejection of life and the 
responsible action that life demands. The scene precedes his suicide and 
gives him a last chance to reveal his potential for sacrifice and compassion. 
What is missing in Quentin's encounter with the Italian child is w:i:l-1;. and, 
ironically, the suicide that follows is the only change Quentin willfully 
effects. Suicide is the one significant act that Quentin intends, plans, and 
completes but it is, at the same time, a repudiation of all possible existential 
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demands. What Benjy unwittingly accomplishes by redefining the real world 
in terms that he can mana!l;e, Quentin accomplishes in death. One seeks uncon-
sciously,and the other consciously, to stabilize that which is emotionally 
satisfying and forestall that which is difficult and painful. 
The similarities in Benjy's and Quentin's responses to reality are even 
more specific when we examine the kinds of images by which Quentin renders 
his private vision. These images are strikingly similar to those disclosed 
in the latent rhetoric of the Benjy section. One such parallel involves the 
two brothers' conception of fire. Quentin's vision of the "clean flame," 
which he imagines to isolate and eternalize his relationship with Caddy, is 
as disarmingly beneficent as Benjy's "bright, smooth, shapes." Both images 
accomplish a childish resolution of problems by according flames the benign 
qualities of containment and eternality. Benjy's real or imagined vision of a 
flickering fire soothes his spirit by suggesting an endless duplication of 
itself. Quentin too imagines his "clean flame" perpetuating endlessly an insu-
lar relationship with Caddy. If he says that he and Caddy have committed 
incest, then he envisions the flames of hell to which they would be banished, 
protecting them eternally and blissfully from the disapproval of the social 
world. 
If it could just he a hell beyond that! The clean 
flame the two of us more than dead. Then you will 
have only me then only me then the two of us amid 
the pointing and the horror beyond the clean flame 
. • • Only you and me then amid the pointing and the 
horror walled by the clean flame. (144) 
In isolation, both Quentin's and Benjy's perceptions of fire are similarly 
\ 
comforting and eccentric. Considering them in their contexts, however, we 
find an important difference. For Benjy, fire is, unconditionally and 
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absolutely, "bright, smooth, shapes." Quentin's fire-image, on the other 
hand, is cast in conditional, rhetorical terms. "If it could just be ••• ," 
he says, and indicates thereby that he knows it cannot be. - Unlike Benjy, 
Quentin may perceive reality accurately while persisting in paradoxical visions 
of a reality that is comfortingly redefined. It is most appropriate that Quen-
tin bridge the gap between the way things are and the way he wishes they could 
be with a mental trick. Emotionally he is still a child; mentally he is fully 
mature. He redefines a threatening world by containing both its reality and 
its reassuring unreality in paradox. 
Quentin's imagistic descriptions of motion also echo Benjy's distorted 
conceptions of motion. Even as a child Quentin enjoyed a paradoxical percep-
tion of motion. When he awaited the school's dismissal bell he says that his 
insides felt as though they were "moving sitting still." (109) When older 
and a student at Harvard he implies a similar but more embellished concept. 
In the following passage, Quentin describes the movement of a train: 
And all that day, while the train wound through 
rushing gaps and along ledges where .movement was 
only a laboring sound of the exhaust and groaning 
wheels and the eternal mountains stood fading into 
the thick sky, I thought of home. (108) 
Like Benjy, Quentin distorts the nature of motion by the perceptual slant he 
assumes. The difference is that Benjy cannot achieve an accurate concept of 
motion because he cannot understand causality. He compensates for this mental 
void by attempting to perceive motion in other, albeit inaccurate, terms that 
reassure him. But Quentin is entirely capable of perceiving the world accu-
rately. Since motion is as threatening to him as it is to Benjy, he circumvents 
its essence and chooses a perceptual angle that distorts the total vision. 
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Quentin's description of the train's movement is accurate but partial. 
Though the train 1 s movement is, in fact, recorded by the groaning wheels and 
the "labori.ng sound" of the exhaust, the perceptual emphasis, the choice of 
sound as the measure of that which i.s seen, reveals the psychological motiva-
tion behind the image. Through the paradoxical identification of sight with 
sound, Quentin can acconunodate his perceptual preference while retaining a 
certain mental accuracy. 
In other images of motion, Quentin satisfies his emotional needs and .. 
perceptual preferences by extracting from a total view of the world only a 
segment of its reality. Again, paradox almost self-consciously bridges the 
gap between perceptual accuracy and emotional needs; for, while Quentin des-
cribes a portion of a scene accurately, that very tendency to segment reflects 
his determination to perceive motion in a narrow and unthreatening way. In 
his wanderings by the river in New Haven, he looks through a vertical crack 
in a wall and sees a gull flying between two moving ships. 
in a break in the wall I saw a glint of water and two 
masts, and a gull motionless in midair, like on an 
invisible wire between two masts. . • . (llO) 
Quentin proceeds to descrihe the fanciful unreality of the scene, the ship's 
unconnected movement, and the apparent motionlessness of the hovering gulls. 
the ship herself was like she was moving without visible 
means • • • . The ship went through the bridge, moving 
under bare poles like a ghost in broad day, with three 
gulls above the stern like toys on invisible wires. (110) 
The metaphors accurately describe the way the scene appears to Quentin. The 
gulls do not seem to be flying if juxtaposed to the moving ships and insulated 
by the two walls from stationary objects. The portion of the scene that is 
framed by the break in the wall isolates the ship from the towboat and creates 
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the impression of self-propelled, ghost-like motion. The fact that Quentin 
enjoys seeing the moving ships in this unconventional way, reflects his pre-
ference for unthreatening, "still" motion and his propensity for the paradoxi-
cal conception. The break in the wall is Quentin's version of curling flower 
spaces. It is an apt metaphor for his perceptual preferences, for; while 
providing a narrowly accurate "frame" of reality, it also lifts a segment of 
reality from the whole, making static the otherwise dynamic quality of motion. 
One final similarity between Quentin's and Benjy's perceptions of motion 
testifies to Faulkner's structural attempt to compare the two brothers. We 
remember that the Benjy section ends with a bedtime scene that recalls an 
earlier bedtime in which Caddy sleeps with Benjy, the darkness goes, and the 
"smooth, bright shapes" begin to flow. We also remember that Benjy describes 
the "shapes" of sleep and the motion of the fire in identical terms. Through 
both structure and image, the Quentin section reproduces a similar relation-
ship. Notice that r'elationship in Quentin's description of a floating leaf: 
When you leave a leaf in water a long time after a 
while the tissue will be gone and the delicate fihers 
waving slow as the motion of sleep. (144) 
Quentin's equation of motion and sleep is neither so simplistic nor literal 
as Benjy's, but he elaborates upon the same eccentric perception. The fibers 
of the leaf reproduce the self-consuming motion of waves which, he implies, 
is comparable to the "slow" motion of sleep. Of particular note is Quentin's 
use of the participial form of the verb "to wave. 11 This reflects, as do fre-
quent such uses in the Benjy section, a habit of mind that superimposes des-
\ 
criptive, not dynamic qualities on the real world. Accuracy, however, is 
again granted a certain deference for the description of the disintegrating 
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leaf requires no flight of the imagination. The metaphor itself betrays 
Quentin's perceptual prejudices, for motion is perverted into the non-motion 
of sleep. Quentin longs for, and, through his death by drowning, achieves 
the kind of motional state that is slow, nearly inert, like sleep. Both 
Benjy's smooth-flowing sleep and Quentin's drowning occur at the ends of 
their respective narrations and offer a kind of epitaph on the lives that we 
have known so intimately. 
Quentin's story, like all great tragedies, is suffused in irony. A 
comparison of Benjy's and Quentin's predicaments clarifies and enhances this 
irony. Both brothers share the same fears, exhibit the same inflexibilities, 
and exercise somewhat similar perceptual distortions. Benjy, however, is not 
able to attain any degree of freedom, for he is ultimately dependent upon 
the people and circumstances that surround him. Even the possibility of free-
dom is, for him, a moot issue. Furthermore, he cannot change or grow. Though 
we may see him meet challenges or retreat from them, make valiant attempts to 
communicate, or withdraw into the smooth flowing of memories--all in one day--
we do not perceive any alteration in the ran~e of his abilities and responses 
from 1898, when Damuddy dies, to 1928, when his one-day narration takes place. 
If we consider Faulkner a naturalist, then we might conclude that Quentin 
is as much a slave to genetics or whimsical circumstances as Benjy. The jux-
taposition of the first two sections of the novel cautions against that con-
clusion, however, for Benjy's and Quentin's possibilities for at least a 
degree of freedom are unmistakably contrasted. Quentin possesses in great 
abundance the intellectual tools to insure, at the very least, an accurate 
\ 
and complete perception of reality. He prefers to see the ship and the gulls 
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through a break in the wall rather than to see them in the context of reality's 
multifariousness. It is easier to see Caddy in relation to his own needs 
rather than to see her as a whole person with the capacity for nurturing 
• 
diverse relationships. In short, Quentin is self-indulgent, and he nurses 
his fears and feeds his obsessions with zealous and misdirect.ed energy. 
In the sequence of Benjy's and Quentin's narratives, a dynamic structural 
pattern emerges and becomes full-blown by the end of Jason's section. The 
pattern is based on a kind of incremental comparison. Quentin is like Benjy 
emotionally and perceptually, though certainly not intellectually. He should 
potentially be Benjy's opposite; but he is, in fact, very much like him. Jason, 
as we shall see, is the reverse of Quentin yet, like his brothers, h~ too feeds 
his obsessions, distorts the nature of effective motion.and perceives reality 
narrowly. 
Although Jason is the most practical character in the novel, and although 
he is the most rational of his ~mily, he too longs to control the open-ended-
ness of life's continuum. He is, in a more tangible sense, frustrated by the 
impossibility of his task. As critics have repeatedly noted, Benjy has no 
conception of time, Quentin flees the exigencies of time, and Jason constantly 
and unsuccessfully attempts to catch up with time. 17 The same is true of 
motion and the completed act. In his confusion, Benjy distorts the nature of 
motion. Quentin retreats from action by refusing to perceive it in its 
17 Perrin Lowery, "Concepts of Time in The Sound and the Fury," in 1.\ren-
tieth Century Interpretations of "The Sound and the Fury," ed. Michael H. 
Cowan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 54-59. 
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unsegmented, untsolated form. The portion of Jason's life that we are 
allowed to see is full of furious, inadequate motion as he rushes too late 
to the futures market, too late to conceal Quentin's widely known promis-
cuity and, in the last section of the novel, too late to overtake Quentin and 
her lover and recapture the money that had been the object of years of acqui-
sitive scheming. In the final section we see Jason in frantic pursuit, 
being overcome slowly and painfully by the gasoline fumes. This is as fitting 
and penetrating an image for Jason as the vertical image of masts and gulls 
is for Quentin or bright, smooth, shapes for Benjy. Jason is defeated literally 
by the fuel and figuratively by the fury of motion. He is a victim of his own 
obsession. After the job with the bank was denied him by an unanticipated 
change in circumstance, he spends his life and energy in a single-minded 
effort to establish absolute control over people and situations. Jason's 
life-long response to this early injustice is grossly disproportionate. While 
Quentin may be unduly concerned with the past, Jason is unduly concerned with 
the future and his ever-elusive efforts to correct a single and distant in-
justice. 
Unlike Quentin, Jason is a man of action. His acting to control 
reality, however, is as distorting to truth as Quentin's immobility or 
Benjy's private vision. These distorted perceptions support in a negative 
sense the assumption that affirmative value lies in what Millgate calls 
"the multivalence of truth." The Sound and the Fury dramatizes, he says, 
man's 
•.• tendency to make of truth a personal thing: 
each man, apprehending some fragment of the truth, 
seizes upon that fragment as though it were the 
whole truth and elaborates it into a total vision 
of the worl~ 8 rigidly exclusive and hence utterly fallacious. 
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Support for such a multivalent perception of truth is not based solely upon 
the Compson brothers' failures. The Negro servant Dilsey is one character 
who approaches an understanding of truth's multivalence. Dilsey endures in the 
existential sense. She endures in time and in spirit; she needs no proof of 
her existence for "Al 1 I got to do is say I' se here." (71) She needs no 
private world, no lofty codes of honor, no trappings of success to announce 
or insure her existence. Faulkner scatters repeated clues suggesting that 
Dilsey's perceptions of reality are accurate and incisive. She knows what 
mischief Luster is about even when she doesn't see him. She knows Mrs. Comp-
son's movements without seeing them. 
Dilsey raised her face as if her eyes could and did 
penetrate the walls and ceiling and saw the old woman 
in her quilted dressing gown at the head of the 
stairs . . (33f.-7) 
She knows that it is eip,ht o'clock even when the one-handed clock strikes 
five. She sees life in its wholeness for "I've seed de first en de last," 
"seed de be~inning, en now I sees de ending." (371) 
Dilsey does not bear the burden of affirmation alone. Structurally, she 
cannot outweigh the Compson brothers' fallacious visions of truth. Dilsey 
does not tell her own story, nor reveal the workings of her consciousness in 
a way that allows the reader to analyze, test, and unequivocally affirm her 
perceptions. Instead, the structure of the novel offers the reader his own 
opportunity to perceive truth in the manner in which it ought to be perceived. 
18 Millgate, p. 87. 
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If we review the structure of the novel and the observant reader's res-
ponse to that structure, we find that the reader experiences through the 
novel's informing aesthetic the truth that it holds so subtly. The first 
section is preeminently important for in it two challenges are confronted 
and overcome. The firat section stands, first, as Faulkner's response to the 
aesthetic challenge that he puts to himself so often. Addie Bundren of !!_..!. 
Lay Dyins phrases that challenge in the following way: 
. . . I would think how words go straight up in a thin 
line and how terribly doing goes along the earth, 
clinging to it, so that after a while the two lines are 
too far apart for the same person to straddle from one 
to the other . • • 19 
.•. words are no good; . words don't ever fit 
even what they are trying to say at.20 
Arnold Weinstein phrases the challenge in the words of the critic. 
Underlying Faulkner's aesthetic is the fear that rational 
sequential discourse deadens experience, prevents it from 
being as ~yving--in both senses of the words--as he wants 
it to be. 
Benjy's section is a specific answer both to Faulkner's fears and Addie's 
cynicism. In Benjy's section the efficacy of, the "word" itself is at stake. 
Benjy has no words; Faulkner must endow his silent creation with words so 
close to his "doing" and his being that they succeed in communicating to the 
reader a distinct and knowable consciousness. Because the "word" can be 
19william Faulkner, As I Lay Dying (New York: Vintage Books, Alfred A. 
Knopf and Random House, 1946), p. 165 
2
°Faulkner;\ As I Lay Dying, p. 163. 
21 i i 118 We nste n, p. . 
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effective, the reader, in turn, may meet Faulkner's challenge to him--that 
he assume Benjy's point of view and accept all of the stringent limitations 
that Benjy's vision imposes. 
Reading Benjy's story is an experience in perceptual adaptation, for 
Benjy's world is narrow and his rhetoric is eccentric. Such an ex~erience is 
necessary, however, for it not only bears witness to the efficacy of the 
''word," but it also prepares us for the Quentin and Jason sections of the 
novel. Though Quentin and Jason seize upon different fragments of tI\lth for 
their frenzied elaborations, their perceptions of truth are as narrow and dis-
torted as Benjy's. We adapt to their worlds and adopt their perceptual angles 
with greater ease and insight because of Benjy's existence. 
In the fourth and final section of The Sound and the Fury the motifs of 
both form and content converge. This is accomplished in great part by Faulk-
ner's choice of point of view. In a clear and persuasive essay, Margaret 
Blanchard argues that the fourth section is narrated from the reader's point 
of view because the speaker is neither omniscient, nor entirely without in-
22 
volvement. Faulkner compliments the reader by adopting his point of view 
23 
and seeing the Compson world from his angle of vision. It is this perspec-
tive that allows the union of aesthetic and thematic statements; for not only 
may we witness Dilsey's indorninability and multivalent perception, but we 
actually experience a kind of total vision of Faulkner's aesthetic and through 
22 Margaret\Blanchard. "The Rhetoric of Communion: Voice in The Sound 
and the Fury," American Literature, 41 (January, 1970), p. 556. 
23Blanchard, P• 561. 
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his aesthetic, his ethic as well. 
The most insistent demonstration of Faulkner's aesthetic occurs in the 
last scene of this final section. That scene serves as a structural counter-
part of the first scene in the novel. The novel begins and ends with images 
of vision. The first sentence of the novel depicts Benjy's point of view, 
describes his vision, and gives insight into his perceptual individuality. 
"Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them 
hitting." (1) The last scene of the novel depicts the kind of vision Faulk-
ner seeks to elicit from the reader. The setting of the scene is important, 
for again it involves Benjy and reminds us of his rigid and very personal 
sense of reality. Luster takes Benjy for another carriage-ride; but this 
time Luster drives around the left, rather than the right, side of the Confed-
erate monument. Reacting to this alteration in ritual, Benjy becomes hysteri-
cal. He is calmed only when Jason stops the carriage and directs Luster to 
drive the usual way. 
Queenie moved again, her feet began to clop-clop steadily 
again, and at once Ben hushed. Luster looked quickly back 
over his shoulder, then he drove on. The broken flower 
dropped over Ben's fist and his eyes were empty and blue 
and serene again as cornice and facade flowed smoothly 
once more from left to right; post and tree, window and 
doorway, and signboard, each in its ordered place. (401) 
The vision that informs these sentences is a total. vision, one that encom-
passes, first of all, Benjy's own distorted vision, his eyes that are serene 
and blue only when the shapes of his world flow smoothly, predictably, and 
in their "ordered place.'' Our vision includes Benjy's vision, but it trans-
cends it as well. The reader's vision and perception originates in the 
ironical view. A juxtaposition of the first and last sentences of the novel 
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clarifies this ironical view, for it su~gests that irony arises in the dis-
crepancy between the narrow vision of truth and the novel's message that such 
truth is really un-truth, that rigid ')rd er is disorder in disguise. In the 
final section of the novel, the reader is both involved and detached, able 
to understand Benjy's vision of truth and appreciation of order, and able, at 
the same time, to see that this kind of fragmented perception has brought, 
through Quentin and Jason, chaos, tragedy, and futility into the Compson 
world. The novel does not moralize directly, but its structure allows us--
indeed, begs us--to experience its aesthetic--to move sympathetically and 
insightfully through the private worlds of Benjy, Quentin, and Jason to a 
rea liza ti on that their visions of truth are fragmented and fallacious. Moving 
through the novel is an experience hoth in "words" and in "doing," for the 
reader must perceive and participate in motion in a way that Benjy cannot and 
Quentin and Jason do not. In Faulkner's description of the way the viewer 
participates in the aesthetic experience of Cezanne's Impressionistic paintings, 
he might well have been descrihing the reader's involvement in the aesthetic 
that informs The Sound and the Furv. 
24 
The viewer is forced to do a ~ood share of the labor 
of composition, to enter into the process of construc-
tin~ the picture along with the painter, to recapitu-
late and bring to life the painter's experience of the 
scene. For those ~ho are not too lazy to do the 
necessary work, the result is a richly dynamic esthetic 
experience, which the artist does not present to the 
viewer so much as he allows and encourages the viewer 
to share it. 24 
William Faulkner. As quoted by Linda Welshimer Wagner, Hemingway and 
Faulkner (Metuchen, N .• T.: 1975), 13f\. 
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